Most First Amendment theories focus on the values served by freedom of expression, resulting in First Amendment analysis based on the content of messages, modes of communication or identities of speakers. This article suggests that a more appropriate approach consists of focusing on the actions of government that restrict free expression. This approach is based on the premise that the courts' function is to determine when a particular government action violates the First Amendment, not whether the expression at issue is entitled to constitutional rotection. The government action approach requires ju 8 icial consideration of three key factors: (1) the role government is playing at the time it engages in regulation of expression; (2) the justification for the government action; and (3) the nature of the restriction. >In developing theoretical frameworks within which to analyze free expression cases, most writers have focused on the values served by freedom of speech and of the press. This has led them to define First Amendment rights primarily in terms of the content of messages, modes of communication 01: identity of speakers.' This article argues that a more appropriate and fruitful approach to First Amendment analysis consists of focusing on the actions of government that restrict free expression. The distinction between the traditional approach to First Amendment theory and the approach suggested in this paper can best be illustrated by looking at the fundamental questions each approach seeks to answer. Traditional First Amendment theorists pose the questions: What do we want the First Amendment to accomplish?" and 'Is this expression protected by the First Amendment?" The approach suggested here asks: "What do we want the Fist Amendment to prevent?" and 'Is this governmental action prohibited by the F i s t Amendment?"
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Wilson expanded on this theme during the Pennsylvania ratifying convention:
[Iln a government, consisting of enumerated powers, such as is proposed for the United states, a bill of rights wouM not only be unnecessary, but, in my humble judgment, highly imprudent. In all societies, there are many powers and rights, which cannot be particularly enumerated. A bill of rights annexed to a constitution, is an enumeration of the powers reserved. If we attempt an enumeration, every thing that is not enumerated, is presumed to be given. The consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied power into the scale of the government; and the rights of the people would be rendered incomplete. On the other hand; an imperfect enumeration of the powers of government, reserves d implied power to the people; and, by that means the constitution becomes incomplete; but of the two it is much safer to run the risk on the side of the constitution; for an omission in the enumeration of the powers of government, is neither so dangerous, nor important, as an omission in the enumeration of the rights of the people."
But such an enumeration of the rights of the people was exactly what many Americans, including members of state ratifying conventions, demanded." Thus, the Constitution was ratified, but only after its s u p porters had promised the addition of a bill of rights.
What spurred the demand for a bill of rights? Was it a desire for an articulation of fundamental human rights, a statement of general beliefs about the nature of liberty? Or was it a fear of authoritarianism based on experience and a desire to impose restrictions on the new national government? Certainly, a s historians have noted, some of the Antifederalists' calls for a bill of rights were merely a smoke Screen for their more fundamental objections to the C~nstitution,'~ a tactical maneuver to stir up opposition to what they perceived as an excessively strong central government that threatened to 'destroy the states" and 'deteriorate into monarchy or despotism."" Although some of the Antifederalists' arguments on behalf of a bill of rights may have been disingenuous, the theme that clearly surfaces in their demands is the need to restrain g~vernment.'~ In his detailed study of the Antifederalists, Main asserted that at 'the core of Antifederalist thought" were 'certain key assumptions and their implications, of which the first was the danger of granting power .... [Tlhe Antifederalists asserted that the Constitution granted power to a dangerous extent and did not restrain the wielders of that power."16 For example, in a letter to Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph, Congressman Richard Henry Lee, whom Main characterized as a 'moderate" Antifederali~t,~' urged the addition of a bill of rights by stressing the need to restrain power: 'Is there not a most formidable combination of power thus created in a few, and can the most critic eye, if a candid 68 JOURNALISM QUARTERLY one, dncover responsibility in this potent corps? Or will any sensible man say, that great power without responsibility can be given to rulers with safety to liberty?"" Once James Madison decided to support amendments to the Constitution, h e too adopted the Antifederalists' anti-authoritarian theme." In his speech to the House of Representatives on June 8,1789,
Madison first reiterated the oft-heard Federalist argument that the Constitution had created a government of only limited powers. But, Madison continued, without further restraints the federal government might seek to abuse its limited powers by reliance on the necessary and proper clause. Thus, Madison proposed a bill of rights to prevent legislative and executive abuses of power, as well as abuses by 'the body of the people, operating by the majority against the minority."" According to Professor Ronald Cass, 'Substantive constraints on federal power were not the product of general beliefs in liberty, but of more focused fears about its unjustified infringement."" Considering the eight substantive amendments in the Bill of Rights, Cass concluded that 'the limitations on government responded to specific perceived abuses of government power.. ..The phrasing of the amendments in the negative -as limitations on government rather than as selfcontained guarantees of liberty -is emblematic of their genesis."" Thus, the term Bill of Rights may be a misnomer. As Leonard Levy pointed out, '[Ilt was a bill of restrain is...."P ress Shall Make No Law cx e language of the First Amendment, of course, underscores its restrictive nature: 'Congress shall make no law...."*' "The Framers intended the First Amendment as an added assurance that Congress would be limited to the exercise of its enumerated powers, and there fore they phrased it as an express prohibition against the possibility that Congress might use those powers to abridge freedom of speech or press," wrote Levy?
The importance of the First Amendment's wording becomes evident when it is compared to the wording of earlier drafts of the speech-press clause and the text of the free expression provisions of state constitutions. In 1789 only eight of the thirteen original states had free expression provisions in their constitutions.s Seven of the eight referred only to freedom of the press, while Pennsylvania's Declaration of Rights referred to both speech and pressn Most of these provisions were of the 'ought" or 'ought not" variety, what Irving Brant referred to as 'ethical aphorisms."u For example, the North Carolina Constitution of 1776 declared: The freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of lib erty, and therefore ought never to b e restrained."= T h e 1780 Massachusetts Constitution followed the same pattern: The liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a state it ought not, therefore, to be restricted in this commonweaIhw Even those constitutions that used stronger verbs failed to impose direct restraints on their state governments. For example, the Georgia Constitution of 1789 declared, 'Freedom of the press and trial by jury shall remain inviolable," but imposed no direct prohibition on government action?'
The early drafts of what eventually became the speech and press clauses of the First Amendment largely followed the pattern of the existing state constitutions. Three states in ratifying the Constitution recommended amendments to protect freedom of the press. New York's suggested amendment adopted the 'ought not" approach of most state provisions: T h a t the Freedom of the Press ought not to be violated or restrained."= Both Viginia and North Carolina suggested amendments modeled after Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution, which asserted both free speech and press rights but did not specifically restrict government action. The Virginia version read: "That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and of publishing their sentiments; that the freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty and ought not to be violated."" In the preamble to its proposed bill of rights, however, Virginia clearly demonstrated a concern for states rights and a desire to restrict the powers of the federal government with these words: '[Almong other essential rights the liberty of Conscience and of the Press cannot be cancelled abridged restrained or modified by any authority of the United States."" Thus the Virginia rat& rying convention was the first to propose a direct and explicit restraint on federal action vis-a-vis expression.
James Madison proposed two separate speech-press amendments to the House of Representatives. Both proposals, unlike the majority of the state constitutions, were written in imperative, rather than exhortative, terms. The first was patterned after the Pennsytvania constitutional provision and the Virginia and North Carolina proposed amendments, but contained 'shall" rather than 'ought" language: The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks A common complaint about First Amendment decisions is that the judic'ky has failed to develop and/or follow a consistent and coherent theory of freedom of expression. This lack of a theoretical base, critics contend, can lead to unprincipled, unclear or inconsistent rulings.* As Martin Redish noted, The apparent concern of many of these commentators has been the historic manipulability that has pervaded judicial construction of the First Amendment, and the resultant reduction in protection of expression in times of crisis.w'6
Numerous theorists have offered alternatives to the judiciary's perceived atheoretical approach to First Amendment adjudication." Most of these theorists focus their inquiries on the message, the speaker or the mode of communication and seek to determine what is protected by the First Amendment by analyzing why expression is protected. Two characteristics such positive or affirmative First Amendment theories share are: (1) they are based on the assumption that the ffee speech and press clauses were designed to further specific affirmative values; and (2) they focus on the content of the communication or nature of the communicative activity. Furthermore, some positive theories are reductionist; that is, they seek to 'reduce the focus of inquiry to a single value served by speech."
Alexander Meiklejohn was the first and is perhaps the best known of the reductionist, positive theorists. In his 1948 work, Free Speech and Its Relotion to Self-Government, which set the tone for much subsequent First Amendment theory, Meiklejohn argued that the sole value to be served by the First Amendment was the self-government value. Thus, public speech or speech relating to self-government is entitled to absolute protection under the First Amendment." Judge Robert Bork also proposed a positive, reductionist approach to the First Amendment based solely on the self-government value. The key difference, however, is that while Meiklejohn, especially in his later writings,s" proposed a broad definition of public speech, Bork would confine the First Amendment's coverage to 'speech that is explicitly political. I mean by that criticisms of public officials and policies, proposals for the adoption or repeal of legislation or constitutional provisions and speech addressed to the conduct of any governmental unit in the country.ws1
Other positive, reductionist theorists have focused on the self-fulfillment value or a variant thereof. These scholars use a variety of names to identify the value they champion, yet all share the common thread of The values sought by society in protecting the right to freedom of expree sion may be grouped into four broad categories. Maintenance of a system of free expression is necessary (1) as assuring individual self-fuIfiUment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth, (3) as a method of securing participation by the members of the society in social, including political, decision-making, pnd (4) as maintaining the balance between stability and change in the sodetyP While emphasizing what might be termed a diversity value in his call for a Fist Amendment interpretation encompassing a right of public access to the mass media, Jerome Barron also recognized a multiplicity of affirmative values underlying constitutional protection for freedom of expression, including "the creation of an informed citizenryms and "the safety valve value of free expression in preserving public ~rder."~' Likewise, Kenneth Karst contended the self-government, search for truth and self-fulfillment values all spring from the central principle of equality, which h e saw underlying the Fist Amendment.% Other theorists such as Vincent Blasi, Lee Bollinger and Steven Shiffrin built strong theories based on a particular value but did not take t h e reductionist's approach of seeking to reduce all First Amendment analysis to focus on that single value.s Blasi, for example, expressly eschewed exclusive reliance on his "checking value."
Throughout the analysis, one must keep in mind that the checking value is to be viewed as a possible supplement to, not a substitute for, the values that have been at the center of twentieth-century thinking about the First Amendment....I do not purport to offer a comprehensive ordering of First Amendment values or to suggest that the checking value should form the cornerstone of all First Amendment analysis. My only purpose is to further the understanding of one basic value which has been underemphasized in this century and which, I b e l i e , should be a significant component in any general theory of the First Amendmentm Both Bollinger and Shiffrin also suggested values that ought to be significant components in F i r s t Amendment theory without purporting to articulate uni-value theories. Bollinger emphasized tolerance as a central intellectual value underlying the First Amendment.6' He described his work as focusing "on the intellectual attributes people bring to the enterprise of truth-seeking, self-governance, or self-realization."= Shiffrin contended "the dissent value" deserves a much more prominent role in First Amendment theory and decision making, yet championed an eclectic approach to First Amendment value identification.
I favor a deliberately schizophrenic approach. For purposes of rhetoric and romance, I believe courts, commentators, and Fourth of July speakers would best serve the interests of the country by associating the First Amendment with the metaphor of dissent, with dissenters and the dissent value For purposes of First Amendment decisionmaking and social engineering, dissent should be afforded a far more prominent place in the 
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JOURNALISM QUARTERLY deficiencies of what he referred to as the 'positive," 'affirmative," or 'valuepromoting" theoretical styles.n First, he said, these theories have failed to describe or predict judicial behavior. Cass conceded this criticism "may be a consequence, rather than a cause of the courts' aversion to the theories," but in light of the other defects he perceived in the positive theories, Cass concluded the lack of predictive power reflected more the weaknesses of the theories than 'erratic, unprincipled decisionmaking by the courts."Y The second defect Cass identified is p r e scriptive the theories, he contended, fail to accomplish their primary goal of replacing uncertainty with certainty. me theories provide few clear guidelines for decisionmakers and fewer clear rules for decision."g Cass's thiid criticism was that "to the extent clear guidance is given, the solutions suggested by the theorists are unfortunate ....
Nearly all of the affirmative theories lend themselves to outcomes that, to me, seem dramatic departures from the commonly understood and commonly accepted purposes of the First Amendment, that is, the understanding of ordinary citizens and the general view of academics not writing First Amendment theory.-O As examples of such "dramatic departures" from common understanding Cass cited Meiklejohn's suggestion that the F i s t Amendment protects pornography but not the speech of paid lobbyists, Baker's opinion that speech by non-media corporations is unprotected because it does not advance personal liberty, and Emerson's and Barron's contentions that 'in order to promote widespread access to diverse opinions, the government is obligated by the First Amendment to regulate speech in at least some instances.''" Cass's criticisms of the socalled positive Fist Amendment theories, however, are equally applicable to any legal theory until it becomes converted into doctrine by the judiciary. For example, prior to 1954 the theory that separate was inherently unequal under the Fourteenth Amendment certainly did not describe or predict judicial decisions, nor did it coincide with the 'understanding of ordinary citizens and the general view of academics" not writing Fourteenth Amendment theory." Neither did the theory of equality 'replace uncertainty with certainty," at least not until scores of cases had served to convert the general framework for analysis into specific rules and tests for dealing with an array of factual situations.
The heart of the problem, therefore, is not the predictive, prescrip tive and normative defects of particular Fist Amendment theories but the fact that most Fist Amendment theories are incongruent with the negatively worded text of the Fist Amendment itself, the legislative history of the amendment and the approach to free speech issues the Supreme Court first undertook in its early 20th-century cases, an approach the Court has continued to follow, to a greater or lesser extent, ever since. of action which, however useful they might be in the service of the general welfare, the legislature is forbidden to take."'O Punishment of Schenck was not one of those forms of action the government was forbidden to take, the Court concluded. Obstruction of recruitment and conspiracy to obstruct recruiting, prohibited by the 1917 Espionage Act and its 1918 amendments, were among 'the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Schenck's pamphlets, perceived as presenting a 'clear and present danger" of bringing about those evils were thus subject to government prohibition." This is not to suggest the Schenck decision was correct. Undoubtedly the Court showed excessive deference to legislative determinations and inadequate consideration of whether the circulars at issue truly presented a clear and present danger to military recruitment. But the point is that in its first forays into First Amendment interpretation, the Supreme Court saw its function as evaluating the legitimacy of the government's actions, not analyzing the value of particular content. The primary reason affirmative, value-seeking approaches to the First Amendment have had minimal success with the courts is that such approaches are inconsistent with the decision making pattern the Court first established in its earliest cases. 
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JOURNALISM QUARTERLY F i r s t Amendment protection on the content of the communication. They invite the courts to draw distinctions among the most valuable speech, less valuable speech and worthless speech. They invite an arm of government itself, the judiciary, to determine what is worth saying and what the public needs or ought to hear. Meiklejohn himself pointed out the key deficiency of the positive, value-promoting theories when he declared, W h a t is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth suying shall be said.""
A Government Action Approach to First Amendment Analysis
The central thesis of this paper is that the First Amendment was designed to prohibit government from taking certain actions, actions that abridge freedom of expression, actions that smack of the sort of authoritarianism the 18th-century supporters of the B i l l of Rights feared and thus sought to prohibit. But as every F i r s t Amendment scholar and judge have recognized, the F i t Amendment does not prohibit government from taking all actions that affect expression. As Cass has noted, the problem is separating legitimate regulation from illegitimate regulation." Or a s McKay has stated, '[Wlhere should the line be drawn between 'abridging,' which is flatly forbidden, and reasonable regulation, which may in some circumstances be permissible!"" This paper is not the first to suggest a negative approach as the best means of separating legitimate regulation of expression from illegitimate abridgements of free speech. '[Flreedom of speech is best characterized as the absence of governmental interference," wrote Professor Frederick Schauer.u M e r a detailed review of the positive justifications for protecting freedom of speech," Schauer concluded 'that the most persuasive argument for a Free Speech Principle is what may be characterized a s the argument from governmental incompetence."" Because of bias, self-interest, and the general urge to suppress that with which one disagrees, 'governments...are less capable of regulating speech than they are of regulating other forms of conduct.""Thus, determining the scope of freedom of speech requires inquiry into governmental j u s @cations for regulation. '[Tlhe question is one that is best looked at not in terms of the object of the regulation, but instead in terms of the purpose or the intent of the regulation.% Cass, contending 'the appropriate goal for Fist Amendment scrutiny
[is] preventing speech restraint motivated by personal interest or intolerance," also proposed a negative First Amendment theory.30 Cass characterized government regulation affecting speech as a continuum 'from message regulation, to subject regulation, to regulation of the particular way in which the message is formulated, to regulation of the form in which a message is conveyed, to context-based regulation. At some point along this continuum, the likelihood that regulation serves illegitimate ends diminishes sufficiently that even relatively 'so&' aesthetic concerns will suffice to sustain a speech restraint against challenge.-l Both Schauer and Cass focused primarii on government motives as the test for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate speech regulation. While government motivation is an important factor, and often the crucial factor, in determining the validity of restrictions on expression, this article suggests government's reason for regulating is just one of three key criteria courts must evaluate in applying the F i t Amendment's prohibitions. Determining the legitimacy of government regulation that 'mpacts on speech requires consideration of (1) the role government is playing at the time it engages in regulation, (2) the justification for the government action and (3) the nature of the restriction on expression.
Government's Role
Three distinct, but at times overlapping, government roles are apparent in First Amendment disputes: (1) government as ruler, governor, protector of public safety and welfare; (2) government as proprietor, operator of public property and facilities; and (3) government as arbitrator of private disputes. In each of these roles government enjoys different powers, bears different responsibilities and is subject to different restraints.
Government as ruler is clearly the role the Antifederalists had in mind when they demanded the Constitution be amended to protect freedom of speech and press. The 17th-and 18thcentury history of freedom of expression in England and the American colonies is replete with examples of government using its sovereign powers to license, censor, tax and punish speech deemed dangerous to government and ~ociety.~ It is government as aggressor, seeking to control expression for its own ends or the good of society, that .is at issue here.= Many of the earliest First Amendment cases to reach the Supreme Court were of this sort -federal and state agencies and officials seeking to use their governing power to achieve governmental objectives. The string of sedition cases decided between World War I and World War I1 involved governmental attempts to use criminal statutes to restrict expression deemed dangerous to the state.M Near u Minnesota% resulted from an attempt by government officials to stifle criticism of their performance through a prior restraint in the form of a court order, while in Groqiean u Americatt Press Co.," Louisiana legislators used a tax on newspapers to achieve a similar end. Of course, examples of government as aggressor seeking to control expression to protect itself and/or the public safety and welfare continue to abound today -prosecutions for flag desecration," injunctions on publications aimed at protecting national security," military-imposed restrictions on press coverage of the Gulf Wacrn obscenity lawq1O0 regulation of commercial speech,'O' restrictions on campaign spendinglm and so on. 
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JOURNALISM QUARTERLY Identifying a particular restriction on expression as falling within the category of government acting as ruler, though, is not sufficient to determine the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the action. That requires further inquiry into the nature of the restriction and its justifications. However, as history has taught us, situations in which government acts as the aggressor against speech, seeking to restrict expression to serve its own interests or its perception of the public's interest, are those of which we should be most wary. Thus, such cases deserve the highest degree of judicial scrutiny.
When government acts as proprietor, its key responsibility is to operate public facilities and property in an efficient manner. Efficiency requires government to ensure that a facility it operates effectively performs the function for which it was established. In its development of public forum doctrine and its test for determining the validity of time, place and manner restrictions, the Supreme Court has recognized this fundamental requirement of governmental proprietorship:
The nature of a place, the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kind of regulations of time, place and manner that are reasonable. Although a silent vigil may not unduly interfere with a public library ...making a speech in the reading mom almost certainly would. That same speech should be perfectly appropriate in a park. The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time'
But efficiency is not the only concern facing the judiciary when government functioning in its role of proprietor restricts expression. The first inquiry must be whether government is using its proprietary role to mask an attempt to control speech because of the speech's perceived dangers to government itself or society, rather than its perceived interference with the proper functioning of the public property or facility. This is of special concern since public facilities such as parks, streets and airports are often the only communication channels available to dissident speakers. The requirements that a time, place and manner restriction be content-neutral and leave open alternative channels of communication*M are the means by which courts can identify government as ruler attempting to masquerade as government as proprietor. In Ward u. Rock Against Racism, the Court explained:
The principal inquiry in determining content neutrali ty... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys ....Th e government's purpose is the controlling consideration.w
If indeed a particular restriction on expression is an effort to achieve Vid-proprietary efficiency, the test of its validity is one of effectiveness and reasonableness. Once again the nature of the restriction and government's just%cations must be analyzed to determine the effectiveness and reasonableness of the regulation. This, of course, is the aim of the other prongs of the time, place and manner test. Determining whether the restriction is designed to serve a significant governmental interest assesses government's justifications for regulation, while determining if the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve the governmental interest is an evaluation of the nature of the restraint on expression.'06
The final role of government to be discussed is that of arbitrator of private disputes, the role it plays in civil libel, invasion of privacy, infliction of emotional distress and copyright lawsuits. The key consideration here is that government cannot aid private individuals in achieving that which it cannot constitutionally do itself. What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel," the Court declared in New York Times u. SuNiuan.lw This was the critical point of the Court's discussion of seditious libel in the Sulliuurr case. The libel judgment against the New York Times looked suspiciously like a conviction under the Sedition Act of 1798, which, the Court said, 'because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was inconsistent with the
F i r s t Amendment."'O'
In cases involving government as arbitrator of private disputes, then, the first question is whether civil law is being used to achieve impermissible ends; that is, does the case truly involve merely a private dispute or is it, in reality, an effort by government to punish certain messages because of their alleged deleterious effects on society or government itself? Is the case more correctly categorized as government acting as aggressor rather than government as arbitrator? If government is using civil law and private suits to achieve that which it cannot constitutionally achieve through criminal prosecutions and prior restraints, the case then falls in the category of government acting as aggressor against expression and must be subjected to the highest level of judicial scrutiny.' @ If government is indeed acting as arbitrator of private disputes, the fundamental considerations of the court must be fairness, justice and equity, necessitating a balancing of interests. But when courts are faced with civil lawsuits involving F i s t Amendment rights, it is not just the interests of the litigants that must enter into the balance. Here is where the positive societal values served by free expression must be considered as part of the balance. The public's interest in the 'unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the peopleW1'O must be given adequate weight in the balancing process.
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Justifications for Government Restrictions on Expression.
As both the Court and commentators have noted, regulatory motivations cannot be the sole determinant of the legitimacy of restrictions on expression.ll' In the first place, it is not always possible to ascertain the true motives underlying restrictions on expression. Furthermore, the Supreme Court traditionally has been suspicious of 'the end justifies the means" arguments in First Amendment cases. For example, in Schneider u Ztviq#onl" the Court struck down an ordinance outlawing leafletting that was aimed at preventing littering, not prohibiting dissemination of certain messages or content. The Court relied on Low11 Y. Gdfin,lu which it described as holding that 'whatever the motive, the ordinance was bad because it imposed penalties for the distribution of pamphlets, which had become historical weapons in the defense of lib erty, by subjecting such distribution to license and censorship."'" More recently in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. u. Minnesota Commissioner of Reuenue, the Court struck down a tax on newspapers but noted it did not intend to 'impugn the motives of the Minnesota legislature" in enacting the use tax on paper and ink. 'Illicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment."1fi
Pronouncements regarding the unimportance of government motivations, however, have come primarily in cases in which governmental motives were 'pure" but the Court nonetheless found the regulation invalid under the First Amendment. Far more commonly, the Court does consider governmental motives. Most of the tests the Court has devised over the past few decades to evaluate the constitutionality of restrictions on expression contain a prong requiring judicial evaluation of government motives or justifications for regulation. As discussed above, the time, place and manner regulation test demands a 'signii cant government interest,"11s as does the O'Brien test for determining when government can punish symbolic speech or nonverbal communication"' and the Central Hudson test for determining when commercial speech can be regulated.lU The test for determining when criminal judicial proceedings can be closed to the press and public consistent with the F i r s t Amendment requires ' a compelling governmental interest" to justify closure,1s as does the test for determining when restrictions on political expression by nonmedia corporations are valid.m Thus, the Supreme Court regularly uses governmental justifications for restrictions on expression as a key criterion in its Fiit Amendment analysis.
Under the government action approach to the F i i t Amendment suggested here, regulatory motive is not the sole criterion for determining constitutionality, although in many cases it will be the critical factor. It becomes the critical factor because, as discussed above, a key purpose of the Bill of Rights was to prevent authoritarianism. T o the authoritari- Perhaps the most succinct statement of-government's power to p r e tect public safety and welfare is the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution, listing the reasons for adoption of the Constitution: "to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."lZ3 As First Amendment history has shown us, government frequently has perceived expression as a threat to achieving these constitutional goals. Bans on picketing," marchesm and flag desecration" have been justified as means of insuring domestic tranquility; prior restraints on publication as necessary for the common defense;In and judicial gag orders as necessary to protect the faii administration of justice." However, justifying infringements on expression on the basis of protecting public safety and welfare does not guarantee governmental success in F i t Amendment disputes, as the outcomes of the cases demonstrate. The reason, of course, is that government is also charged with 'securing the Blessings of Liberty," including the liberty of speech and press expressly protected by the First Amendment. Government must strive to ensure domestic tranquility, justice, national security and the general welfare without resort to authoritarian measures that trample upon lib erty. But the governmental obligation under the Constitution cuts both ways. Just as government cannot sacrifice liberty on the altar of tranquility, justice, national security or public welfare, it cannot sacrifice those goals on the altar of liberty. Thus, when determining whether an abridgement of expression is necessary to protect public safety or welfare, a court must analyze the sufficiency of government's justifications for regulation, whether government's goals can be achieved through other means that do not impact on First Amendment rights and the nature of the regulation b e i i imposed. As Franklyn Haiman has explained, 'Our real dilemma, then, in interpreting the F i r s t Amendment is not in deciding whether N d a n k a R r r h w c i U i o n v . S u r t , 
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JOURNALISM QUARTERLY speech should euei be abridged but in determining the circumstances which may justify restrictions on communication.D129 The question, though, is not whether the content of the speech or identity of the speaker or the mode of expression places the communication in some "lesser value" category, thereby making it easier for government to justify restrictions. The question is whether under the circumstances a restriction on expression is necessary to achieve one of government's legitimate functions. This in turn requires a fivefold inquiry: 1) What is government's stated justification for the regulation? 2) Is the stated justification directly related to achieving the legitimate governmental goal or is it a mask for achieving an impermissible goal?
3) Does the regulation of expression directly achieve the legitimate governmental goal? 4) Are there alternative means of achieving the governmental objective that would not impinge on free expression? 5) Is the regulation no more extensive than necessary to achieve the governmental goal?
The framework for analysis suggested here is similar to that used by the courts in many types of First Amendment cases.1m It focuses solely, however, on the legitimacy of government's motives and actions and allows no inquiry into the value of particular messages, modes of communication or speakers.
The second governmental justifcation for infringements on expression, protection of individual interests, arises primarily in those cases in which government acts as arbitrator of private disputes. Libel law is justified as a means protecting individual reputation, privacy law as a means of protecting the individual's right to be left alone, infliction of emotional distress law as means of protecting individuals from mental and emotional harm, and copyright law as a means of protecting the property rights of authors and artists. As discussed above, however, when government acts to protect the personal or property rights of individuals in a manner that abridges the free expression rights of others, the governmental justification for regulation must always be weighed against not only the rights of the individual defendant but also the rights of the public to enjoy the fruits of free expression. The need to protect the public's interest in the free flow of information and ideas has continually been recognized by the courts as they have arbitrated private disputes. The need to temper government protection of individual interests with concern for the public interest has been recognized in a variety of ways: the actual malice requirement in public official and public figure libel actions,131 false light invasion of privacy suits,1u and intentional infliction of emotional distress actions;1u the requirement that defendants prove falsity in libel suits arising from the discussion of matters of public interescm the protection for reports on matters of public interest in disclosure of private facts lawsuits;'" and the fair use defense in copy- it was designed to prohibit. These theories present both practical and philosophical problems. R a c t i d y , these positive theories are incongruent with both the negatively worded text of the amendment and with the general approach to First Amendment adjudication the Supreme Court embarked upon in its earliest free expression cases when it sought to determine whether such government actions as prosecutions for sedition, prior restraints and taxes on newspapers constituted forbidden government actions.17s The Court, though, has often strayed from the negative approach to First Amendment analysis. Those cases in which the Court utilized a positive, valueseeking approach to interpreting the First Amendment demonstrate the key philosophical defect of that approach: It invites judicial evaluation of the value of messages, speakers and modes of communication.
The government action approach to First Amendment analysis suggested in this article is premised on the belief that, in applying the First Amendment, courts ought not consider whether some speech is more valuable than other speech, or whether one speaker deserves greater First Amendment protection than another, or whether one mode of communication is entitled to greater protection than another. Instead, courts should focus on the government action being challenged to determine whether it constitutes an abridgement of 6ree expression or legitimate regulation. This determination requires consideration of three factors: the role government is playing when it restricts expression, government's justification for its action and the nature of the restriction itself.
This article provides only an overview of the government action approach to First Amendment analysis. Admittedly, much more explication and analysis are needed, most notably a thorough review of cases in which the Supreme Court used a negative, government action approach and applition of the government action approach to cases in which the Court relied on positive, valuepromoting modes of analysis.
The main goal of this article, however, has been to argue that the focal point of First Amendment analysis is often misplaced. Perhaps one of the best illustrations of this point is Young v. American Mirti Theatres, in which the Court upheld stringent zoning restrictions on businesses specialiiing in nonobscene, sexually explicit materials. In explaining the Court's decision, Justice Stevens' wrote:
[Elven though we recognize that the Erst Amendment win not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political de bate.... [Flew of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specifml Sexual Activities" exhib ited in the theaters of our choice."'
